docs: proposal for enhancing scoped repository credentials (#18290)

* docs: proposal for enhancing scoped repository credentials

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: flesh out section on project matching

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: scope down proposal

For the sake of time and simplicity, we will not do any modifications
of `repo-creds` secrets for this proposal.

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: added feedback

Feedback from contributors' meeting, part one.

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: modification date

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: remove use cases

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: spec update

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: clarify backward-compatability

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* chore: further clarification of backwards compatibility

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* Update docs/proposals/project-scoped-repository-enhancements.md

Co-authored-by: Josh Soref <2119212+jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* Update docs/proposals/project-scoped-repository-enhancements.md

Co-authored-by: Josh Soref <2119212+jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* Update docs/proposals/project-scoped-repository-enhancements.md

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* chore: behavior in line with current impl

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* docs: add reviewers

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

* Update docs/proposals/project-scoped-repository-enhancements.md

Co-authored-by: Josh Soref <2119212+jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>

---------

Signed-off-by: Blake Pettersson <blake.pettersson@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Josh Soref <2119212+jsoref@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Alexander Matyushentsev <AMatyushentsev@gmail.com>

docs/proposals/project-scoped-repository-enhancements.md

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+---
+title: Project scoped repository credential enhancements
+authors:
+  - "@blakepettersson" 
+sponsors:
+  - TBD
+reviewers:
+  - "@alexmt"
+  - "@jsoref"
+  - "@christianh814"
+  - "@wanghong230"
+  - "@yyzxw"
+approvers:
+  - "@alexmt"
+
+creation-date: 2024-05-17
+last-updated: 2024-06-04
+---
+
+# Project scoped repository credential enhancements
+
+## Summary
+
+This is to allow the possibility to have multiple repository credentials which share the same URL. Currently, multiple repository
+credentials sharing the same URL is disallowed by the Argo CD API.
+
+## Motivation
+
+This is to allow the possibility to have multiple repository credentials which share the same URL. Currently, multiple repository
+credentials sharing the same URL is disallowed by the Argo CD API. If the credentials are added directly to the `argocd`
+namespace, we "get around" `argocd-server` returning an error, but this still does not work since the first secret that 
+matches a repository URL is the one that gets returned, and the order is also undefined. 
+
+The reason why we want this is due to the fact that in a multi-tenant environment, multiple teams may want to 
+independently use the same repositories without needing to ask an Argo CD admin to add the repository for them, and then
+add the necessary RBAC in the relevant `AppProject`s to prevent other teams from having access to the repository 
+credentials. In other words, this will enable more self-service capabilities for dev teams. 
+
+### Goals
+
+The goal of this proposal is to allow multiple app projects to have the ability to have separate repository credentials 
+which happen to share the same URL.
+
+### Non-Goals
+
+- Having multiple repository secrets sharing the same URL _within the same_ `AppProject`.
+- Allowing a single repository credential to be used in multiple `AppProject`s. 
+- Preventing non project-scoped repository credentials from being used by an Application.
+- Extending this to repository credential templates.
+
+## Proposal
+
+There are a few parts to this proposal.
+
+We need to distinguish between a user accessing a repository via the API/CLI/UI and an application retrieving repository
+credentials. In the first case, we need to maintain backwards compatibility for API consumers. The current behaviour 
+is that the API will return the first repository found matching the URL given. Since we now want to allow the same URL 
+to potentially be in multiple projects, we need to do some minor changes.
+
+* If there is only one matching repository with the same URL, and assuming the user is allowed to access it _and_ there is
+no app project given as a parameter, use that repository ignoring any project-scope. This is in line with the 
+current behavior.
+* If there is only one matching repository with the same URL, and assuming the user is allowed to access it _and_ there is
+an app project given as a parameter, use that repository only if it also matches the app project given. 
+* If there are multiple repositories with the same URL and assuming the user is allowed to access them, then setting a
+project parameter would be required, since there would otherwise be no way to determine which of the credentials a user
+wants to access. This is not a breaking change since this adds functionality which has previously not existed.
+
+This change would apply when we retrieve a _single_ repository credential, or when we delete a repository credential.
+For listing repository credentials, nothing changes - the logic would be the same as today.
+
+In the case of selecting a suitable repository for an application, the logic would differ slightly. What instead happens 
+is that the lookup would first attempt to find the first `repository` secret which matches the `project` 
+and repository URL of the requesting application. If there are no credentials which match the requested `project`, it 
+will fall back to returning the first unscoped credential, i.e, the first credential with an empty `project` parameter.
+
+When it comes to mutating a repository credential we need to strictly match the project to which the repository belongs, since 
+there would otherwise be a risk of changing (inadvertently or otherwise) a credential not belonging to the correct project.
+This can be done without any breaking changes.
+
+The second part is specifically for when we imperatively create repository secrets. Currently, when we create a repository
+secret in the UI/CLI, a suffix gets generated which is a hash of the repository URL. This mechanism will be extended to 
+also hash the repository _project_.
+
+On the API server side no major changes are anticipated to the public API. The only change we need to do from the API 
+perspective is to add an `appProject` parameter when retrieving or deleting a repository credential. To preserve backwards 
+compatibility this option is optional and would only be a required parameter if multiple repository credentials are 
+found for the same URL.
+
+Finally, we need to change the way the cache keys for the repository paths are generated in the repo-server 
+(see `Security Considerations`). 
+
+### Security Considerations
+
+* Special care needs to be taken in order not to inadvertently expose repository credentials belonging to other `AppProject`s.
+Access to repositories are covered by RBAC checks on the project, so we should be good.
+* We need to change how the cache keys for the checked out repository paths are generated on the repo-server side, the 
+reason being that we do not want separate `AppProject`s sharing the same paths of sources which have been downloaded. 
+With this change there is a potential for multiple `AppProject`s to have rendered/downloaded different manifests due to 
+having different sets of credentials, so to mitigate that we need to check out a separate copy of the repository per 
+`AppProject`.
+
+### Risks and Mitigations
+
+### Upgrade / Downgrade Strategy
+
+When upgrading no changes need to happen - the repository credentials will work as before. On the other hand, when 
+downgrading to an older version we need to consider that the existing order in which multiple credentials with the same
+URL gets returned is undefined. This means that deleting the credentials before downgrading to an older version would be
+advisable.
+
+## Drawbacks
+
+* It will be more difficult to reason about how a specific repository credential gets selected. There could be scenarios 
+where a repository has both a global repository credential and a scoped credential for the project to which the 
+application belongs.
+* There will be more secrets proliferating in the `argocd` namespace. This has the potential to increase maintenance burden
+to keeping said secrets safe, and it also makes it harder to have a bird's eye view from an Argo CD admin's perspective.
+* Depending on the number of projects making use of distinct credentials for the same repository URL, loading the correct 
+credentials from the repository secrets has the potential to scale linearly with the number of app projects (in the worst case 
+scenario we would need to loop through all the credentials before finding the correct credential to load). This is likely 
+a non-issue in practice.
+* Also depending on the number of projects making use of distinct credentials for the same repository URL, this will 
+imply that for each `AppProject` sharing the same repository URL, a separate copy of the repository will be checked out.
+This has potential implications in terms of memory consumption, sync times, CPU load times etc. This is something 
+of which an Argo CD admin will need to be mindful.
+
+## Alternatives
+
+To keep the existing behavior of having a single repository credential shared by multiple `AppProject`s. It would be up 
+to the Argo CD admins to ensure that a specific repository credential cannot be used by unauthorized parties.